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 ABSTRACT 
  
  
MALAKIAN, PEDRAM.   The Impact of Generational Experiences on Anti-immigration 
Sentiments, Department of Economics. June, 2019. 
  
ADVISOR: Lewis Davis 
  
  
 Immigration is one of the most important issues in our increasingly globalized world. 
Every year, millions of people relocate to Europe and United States in an effort to improve the 
quality of life for themselves and their family. With this increase in immigration, there has been 
an emergence of anti-immigration sentiments which have in turn allowed far right political 
parties to gain more power, evident in the British referendum to leave the European Union and 
Donald Trump’s election as President of the United States. While most works of literature look 
at the current work status, education level and income of an individual in explaining how 
anti-immigration sentiments occur, I want to look in more detail at the generational factors that 
cause individuals to think this way. 
 Within The Moral Consequences of Economic Growth, Benjamin Friedman offers a 
theory that people constitute their happiness on comparing it to “benchmark of their own prior 
experiences or their parents”. Thus when they believe that their own lives are better, they feel 
less need to get ahead and they develop a more open view towards immigrants. Building off of 
Friedman’s argument, I ran regressions using GSS data together with several control variable, to 
see if Friedman’s argument that anti-immigration sentiments rise as a product of generational 
experiences rather than based on current socio-economic status, explains the rise that we have 
seen in anti-immigration sentiments. Our results supported some of Friedman’s theory that 
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individuals who receive a higher education and make more money than their parents are more 
tolerant to immigrants however it also revealed that generational changes do not reflect the entire 
story as some generational variables had no impact on our dependent variable. 
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                                                           CHAPTER I  
                                                       INTRODUCTION  
Immigration has become one of the most important issues in an increasingly globalized 
world. Every year, millions of people relocate to Europe and United States in an effort to 
improve the quality of life for themselves and their family. This increase in immigration has 
caused major policy changes for European and North American countries as they attempt to deal 
with the rapid influx of new people within their border. As a result, there has been an emergence 
of anti-immigration sentiments which have in turn allowed far right political parties to gain more 
power. This is evident in the British referendum to leave the European Union and Donald 
Trump’s election as President of the United States. With there being so much backlash against 
allowing immigrants into the country, it is important to look at what factors are causing people to 
be so strongly opposed to immigration. 
Within ​The Moral Consequences of Economic Growth​, Benjamin Friedman offers a 
theory for why anti-immigration sentiments arise. Friedman argues that people are more inclined 
to be generous or tolerant towards immigrants when they are getting ahead. People constitute 
their happiness on comparing it to “benchmark of their own prior experiences or their parents” 
(Friedman 2005, pg 72). Thus when they believe that their own lives, as well their children's 
lives, are better, they consequently feel less need to get ahead and they develop a more open 
view towards immigrants. By continually giving people a sense of living better than they or their 
families have in the past, “sustained growth reduces the intensity of their desire to live better 
than one another” (Friedman 2005, pg 75). Once the growth stops however, no matter how 
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people’s income have risen, it is only a matter of time before habits adapt and the sense of 
heightened well being disappears. When the economy stagnates, the importance people attach to 
living better than others who they compare themselves to becomes more intense and that feeling 
of openness and generosity decreases.  
In this way, Benjamin Friedman argues that anti-immigration sentiments rise as a product 
of generational experiences rather than based on current socio-economic status (Friedman 2005, 
pg 123). The implication for that is people take on certain basic attitudes in young adulthood, 
depending in large part on the economic conditions they experience in these formative years, and 
they retain those attitudes throughout the remainder of their lives. During times of economic 
stagnation, people who feel that they are living no better, or not much better, than their parents 
will search for enemies. As a result, antipathy towards immigrants surfaces with natives looking 
to blame immigrants and immigration as the primary factors in causing economic distress. This 
negative mentality and expectations can pass through generations causing anti-immigration 
sentiments to increase. Once individuals have formed their basic attitudes about such matters, 
they are normally very slow to change them even after an economy has begun to grow again. 
With many works of literature confirming the idea that anti-immigration sentiments 
increase during times of economic downturns, I want to look in more detail at the generational 
factors that cause individuals to think this way. Building off of Friedman’s argument regarding 
the negative feeling towards immigrants arising from generation to generation, I want to explore 
how an individual’s past experiences and history impacts their mentality towards immigrants and 
immigration.With immigration being one of the most important issues in today’s world I feel this 
is an important topic to look at in further detail. As a result of the Great Britain’s exit from the 
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EU and Trump’s election win, other countries such as Brazil, France and Germany have all 
experienced a rise in support for far right political parties. This indicates that anti-immigration 
sentiments are on the rise thus it is important to research the factors that are impacting this 
change in behavior. As well, the results from this paper could have important implications for 
public policy as it reveals that although economic growth has been occuring in America, the 
growth has not been equally distributed. This would suggest that future policies should focus on 
redistribution in order to stop the rise of inequality that has been prevalent within the United 
States.  
           ​                                     ​CHAPTER II 
                      OVERVIEW OF U.S IMMIGRATION HISTORY  
The United States has been the top destination for international migrants since 1960, with 
one-fifth of the world's migrants living there as of 2017 (Zong, Batalova, Hallock 2018, pg ). 
More than 43.7 million immigrants resided in the United States in 2016, accounting for 13.5 
percent of the total U.S. population of 323.1 million, according to American Community Survey 
(ACS) data. Between 2015 and 2016, the foreign-born population increased by about 449,000, or 
1 percent, a rate slower than the 2.1 percent growth experienced between 2014 and 2015 (Zong, 
Batalova, Hallock 2018). Data on the nativity of the U.S. population were first collected in 1850. 
That year, there were 2.2 million immigrants, representing nearly 10 percent of the U.S. 
population. Between 1860 and 1920, the immigrant share of the overall population fluctuated 
between 13 percent and almost 15 percent, peaking at 14.8 percent in 1890, mainly due to high 
levels of immigration from Europe. Due to restrictive immigration laws in 1921 and 1924, along 
with the Great Depression and World War II, there was a sharp drop in new arrivals. As a result, 
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the foreign-born share steadily declined, hitting a record low of approximately 5 percent in 1970. 
Since then, the immigration population has quadrupled reaching 43.7 million in 2016. 
 
                                                               CHAPTER III 
                                  ​THEORIES FOR OPPOSITION AGAINST IMMIGRATION 
With immigration being such a debated topic in global politics, it is important to look at 
the theories that impact public opinion towards immigration. Immigration affects the domestic 
landscapes of receiving countries in different ways and there are numerous studies that use 
different theoretical explanations for the evolvement of anti-immigration sentiments. The 
theories I will look at are group threat theory, competitive threat theory, social identity threat, 
social salience and contact theory.  
Group Threat Theory 
According to the group threat model, presence of an outgroup population prompts fear of 
competition over resources. Fear of competition, in turn, is likely to increase prejudice and 
hostility toward the outgroup population. Threat or fear of competition over resources is a major 
source of anti-immigrant sentiments and their longitudinal change (Kuntz et al. 2017, pg 58). 
The population of a country views economic and cultural resources as scarce and limited. Since 
immigrants are seen as potential competitors for such resources, they become a threat to the well 
being of the populace. The threat is often more evident among the socially and economically 
vulnerable groups. Unemployed individuals with low income or low level of education are 
particularly vulnerable thus they feel the most threatened by the presence of newcomers. This 
threat is fueled by the idea that immigrants take away jobs, exploit the welfare system and 
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compete over housing and other social resources. Group threat theory finds that hostility towards 
an outgroup population is applicable for non material issues as well such as instances in which 
the group feels that their culture and collective identity is being threatened. Natives reaction of 
exclusion and prejudice manifest when their collective economic, cultural, or religious interests 
are threatened (Ceobanu and Escandell 2010, pg 389). This perceived group deprivation can be a 
powerful trigger of hostility.. The fear that immigrants could alter the prevailing way of life or 
the foundation of national identity can lead to an increase in anti-immigration sentiments. 
Competitive Threat Theory 
Competitive theory is similar to group threat theory however while group threat theory 
focuses on majority group members’ identification with their own group, and on the perceived 
threat posed by minority group members, competitive threat theory looks more specifically at 
economic conditions. According to competitive threat theory, “harsh economic conditions 
prompt people to perceive out-group populations as threats to their lives”. Immigrants are 
regarded as competitors who take away opportunities in the labor market. When the economy 
grows, inflow of immigrants are not seen as competition as the economy is booming. However 
when the economy is on a downward spiral, the competition over scarce resources in the labor 
market intensifies. Thus competitive theory suggests that this is likely to increase unfavorable 
attitudes towards immigrants. This is because both the size of the immigrant population and the 
economic situation are viewed as two major sources of competition over social and economic 
resources (Kuntz et al. 2017, pg 232). As rational actors, natives are consistently pursuing their 
own self interest thus they often have unfavorable attitudes towards immigrants in order to 
legitimate their social positions when competing with foreigners over jobs or residential space. 
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This self interest is heightened during times of economic recession (Ceobanu and Escandell 
2010, pg 369).  Several studies provided support for the thesis that depressed economic 
conditions (measured by GNP and unemployment rate) are associated with deeper hostility and 
with negative attitudes toward immigrants (Coenders et al., 2004; Quillian, 1995; Scheepers et 
al., 2002; Semyonov et al., 2000, 2006) 
Social Identity Theory 
The issue of ant-immigration arises as a product of Social identity theory. Social identity 
theories argue that people’s sense of who they are stems from what groups they belong to or 
identify with (Sniderman et al. 2004, pg 401). This identification often leads to in-group 
favouritism and a sense of group superiority which results in the creation of stereotypes (Herbst 
and Glynn 2004, pg 68). A person’s positive identification with his or her own group is thought 
to be accompanied by a simultaneous process of differentiation from outsiders (Ceobanu and 
Escandell 2010, pg 325). Stereotypes reinforce differentiation between other groups and they 
create extra boundaries. A common criticism of this theory relates to the actual causal 
mechanisms implicating ATII and identities, i.e., whether identities determine attitudes or vice 
versa (Ceobanu and Escandell 2010, pg 326) 
Contact Theory  
Ceobanu and Escandell discuss the contact theory as another way of assessing the impact 
of individual factors on attitudes towards immigrants. In the form of the “contact hypothesis”, 
this perspective builds on Allport’s 1954 proposition that contact generally fosters more 
favorable attitudes toward out-group members (Ceobanu and Escandell 2010, pg 320). Some 
scholars use contact theory as a proposition that the presence of immigrants may in fact reduce 
9 
hostility of the host society members toward immigrants rather than increase it (Kuntz et al. 
2017, pg 232). They suggest that contact, which becomes possible when a large number of 
immigrants are present, is a very effective means to reduce enmity of the host society toward 
newcomers by lowering anxiety and increasing knowledge and empathy toward them. A few 
studies have put both group threat and contact theories to test in a single framework. For 
example, Schlüter and Wagner (2008) found empirical support for both of them, implying that 
the two theories are not mutually exclusive but rather complementary. A larger immigrant group 
size both increases threat and contact, whereas contact in turn reduces threat. As well, Kwak and 
Wallace (2018) use competitive threat theory as the primary theory used in their research of the 
effects of economic conditions on anti-immigrant sentiments.  
Social Salience 
Social Salience is another theory that is used to explore social behavior towards 
immigrants. According to Oxtoby (2008), each individual has any number of identities and these 
identities can be can be more or less salient at any moment in time. The relative salience of these 
identities can significantly affect behavior. There is evidence that priming identities affect 
behaviors other than task performance. In an experiment ran by Bargh et al (1996), the authors 
reported that priming an African-American stereotype (through subliminal pictures being flashed 
on a computer screen as a subject is working on a tedious task) caused non-African-American 
participants to react with more hostility to a computer error. Furthermore, research in both 
psychology and economics literature has demonstrated that social identity can affect simple 
social interactions. Identity has been shown to motivate differential treatment of in-group and 
out-group members. Through simple games, Benabou and Tirole (2006) and Akerlof and 
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Kranton (2000) found that the violation of in-group norms by in-group members can be seen as a 
threat to the identity of the group (Ghatak and Verdier 2017, pg 13). As a result, individuals are 
motivated to keep the value of the group identity by punishing the offender. This leads to the 
argument that there can be tension between an individual’s social identity and economic interests 
and depending on the strength of these identities and their salience. For example a poor person 
may not vote for the kind of redistributive policy a purely economic self-interest based argument 
would imply (Ghatak and Verdier 2017, pg 17) 
Building off this argument, Ghatak and Verdier use the Bus Stop example to link the 
social salience of an individual to economic factors. The argument is that in a crowded bus, 
people tend to direct their rage at new passengers who keep on boarding, and want the bus to 
stop at as few stops as possible, but do not ask why there are so few buses (Ghatak and Verdier 
2017). Since ethnic identity is identifiable, it is much easier to blame an identifiable group such 
as immigrants as opposed to blaming the invisible hands of the market. Taking the bus example 
as a metaphor for economic opportunity, as growth slows down, people are more likely to use 
immigrants as scapegoats whose ethnic and cultural differences now seem more salient 
 
                                                             CHAPTER IV  
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND ATTITUDES TOWARDS 
IMMIGRATION  
The previous section gave an overview of theories that attempt to explain why there can 
be negative attitudes towards immigration. Many of those theories are impacted by economic 
determinants. Often times, hostility towards immigrants is increased in times where there is 
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competition over resources and economic concerns. This section will look at various economic 
factors such as globalisation, economic growth, employment status and competition of public 
goods in order to determine the impact that economic factors have on driving negative attitudes 
and opposition towards immigration.  
Globalisation 
With immigration being such a hot topic, many works of literature have looked at the 
economic factors that impact people’s view towards immigration. Within Montserrat Guibernau 
(2010), Guibernau argues that one of the driving factors for the increase in anti-immigration 
sentiments, and in turn the rise in the Far right, has been the rise of globalisation. The process of 
globalisation is having a “major impact on the lives of individuals who see consumption, 
production, leisure, media, education, travel and politics affected by increasing interdependence 
and speed in communications and technological developments” (Gibernau 2010, pg 5 ). As a 
result, the impact of globalisation can affect people's experience of the economy and politics. 
The rise in new radical parties are reflective of “the insecurity and instability brought about by 
rapid social and economic changes and a technological revolution that has resulted in the 
restructuring of the world economy” (Guibernau 2010, pg 7). The shift in manufacturing from 
industrialized societies to developing one's, where production is cheaper and labor regulations 
less strict, creates a sense of vulnerability for those who might lose their job. While a successful 
elite benefits from operating in this global flexible market, a growing number of low and 
medium-skilled workers begin to have lower self esteem and they develop a perception that 
immigrants are coming to their country to steal their jobs.  
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Guibernau (2010) argues that globalisation contributes to cultural anxiety for people who 
are concerned that their culture and language might disappear. An example being the French who 
“are extremely preoccupied about the predominance of English worldwide and, in particular, by 
the progressive displacement of the use of French within EU institutions as well as the 
introduction of English expressions into the French language” (Guibernau 2010, pg 6). This 
feeling of vulnerability and fear can often turn into hostility, xenophobia and racism against 
those regarded as different (Guibernau 2010, pg 12). A significant number of nations and ethnic 
groups share a genuine concern about the possible eventual disappearance of their cultures and 
languages, Guibernau argues that the new radical right has been able to capture these feelings of 
security and uncertainty and “has addressed them through a political discourse based on 
underlying the distinction between those who belong and the “others” (Guibernau 2010, pg 6). 
“In addition, the pervasive threat of terrorism since 9/11 is also associated with “outsiders”, 
people who do not “belong” even if they are citizens” (Guibernau 2010, pg 6). This has caused 
the emergence of ethnic nationalism with this need to “preserve national identity against foreign 
influence” (Guibernau 2010, pg 9) 
Economic Growth and anti-immigration sentiments 
It is often thought that increasing signs of xenophobia are caused by changing economic 
conditions over time. The belief is that public attitudes towards immigrants and immigration 
become more positive in good economic times and more negative in economic downturns. This 
belief is motivated by competitive threat theory which suggests that deteriorating economic 
conditions intensify economic competitions with immigrants for scarce resources such as jobs 
and welfare benefits which contributes to increased anti-immigration sentiments . Wallace and 
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Kwak look at the impact of adverse economic conditions on anti-immigration attitudes by 
investigating the impact of the Great Recession on perceived immigrant threat. As the worst 
economic crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s, the Great Recession of 2007–2010 
disrupted economic security, social status, and ways of life of millions of citizens (Wallace and 
Kwak, pg 4). Couple this time of economic downturn with the increase in immigration and the 
result is a large number of native workers becoming nervous about their economic situation 
“causing them to project their fears and anxieties onto immigrants and triggering support for 
anti-immigrant policies” (Kwak and Wallace, pg 4). 
For their dependent variable, Kwak and Wallace used the ​Perceived Immigrant threat 
(PIT)​ which measures respondents sense of threat from the presence of immigrants in their 
country. he first six questions ask respondents’ how much they agree or disagree with the 
following statements: “(1) Immigrants increase crime rates; (2) Immigrants are generally good 
for [COUNTRY’S] economy; (3) Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in 
[COUNTRY]; (4) Immigrants improve [COUNTRY’S NATIONALITY] society by bringing 
new ideas and cultures; (5) Legal immigrants to [COUNTRY] who are not citizens should have 
the same rights as [COUNTRY NATIONALITY] citizens; (6) [COUNTRY] should take 
stronger measures to exclude illegal immigrants.” The seventh question asks: (7) “Do you think 
the number of immigrants to [COUNTRY] nowadays should be: 1 = increased a lot, 2 = 
increased a little, 3 = remain the same as it is, 4 = reduced a little, 5 = reduced a lot?. In their 
analysis, they found that levels of PIT were positively associated with age, being a citizen and 
being unemployed. These results are consistent with past research on anti-immigration 
sentiment. They conclude that respondents confronted with economic strain display a more 
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negative attitude towards immigrants and that racial prejudices and high local concentration of 
foreigners are associated with a stronger anti-foreigner sentiment. They also found that their data 
supported the rapid immigration influx hypothesis such that that anti-immigrant sentiments 
increase when the immigrant population increases quickly in a short period of time.  
In his paper, Joakim Ruist looks further at this relationship between economic growth and 
anti-immigration sentiments. For this study, Ruist regressed an analysis of how variation in 
macroeconomic conditions influenced the variation in attitudes to immigration over time within 
23 European countries that were observed biannually 2002-2012. The primary measure of 
attitudes to immigration was obtained from the survey question: (1) Is [country] made a worse or 
a better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries? Answers were coded on 
a 0-10 scale with 10 being the most positive reply. The question thus represents an overall 
assessment about the respondents’ perception of whether immigration is bad or good for their 
country. Three indicators were used as macro-level variables to measure business cycle variation. 
Those indicators were real GDP per capita growth rate, the unemployment rate and government 
debt. Ruist’s results indicated that attitudes to immigration become more positive when growth 
increases, unemployment decreases, or government debt decreases. Furthermore, the results 
supported previous studies that claimed attitudes to immigration are more negative among less 
educated, unemployed, and older individuals 
Impact of Employment Status on anti-immigrant sentiment 
 
Building off of the competitive theory that when economic conditions deteriorate, 
negative attitudes towards immigrants rise, Kuntz, Davidov and Semyonov looked at the 
relationship between employment status and anti-immigration sentiments. The belief is that that 
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people feel much more vulnerable about their employment status and income status during times 
of economic downturn and, as a result, will be much less tolerant towards immigrants and 
newcomers. More specifically, unemployed individuals with low (perceived) income or low 
level of education are particularly vulnerable and, thus, threatened by competition due to 
newcomer. These feelings are thought to be enhanced during times of economic downturn. 
Kunts, Davidov and Semyonov wanted to test this theory by analyzing two rounds of the 
European Social Survey with data from before 2006 and after 2010, the peak of the European 
Economic crisis. Their work was based on Competitive Threat Theory and and Group Threat 
model. Using theoretical models and previous studies, Kuntz, Davidov and Semyonov made 
three hypothesis for their paper: At the individual level, they expected that the lower the 
perceived income of the individual, the stronger the negative attitude towards immigrants. 
Relying on the group threat theory, they expected that rising unemployment to result in more 
negative attitudes towards immigrants. Finally, they expected rising aggregate levels of 
subjective income insecurity to result in more negative attitudes toward immigrants. 
Their final results showed that anti-immigrant sentiments increased in countries where 
perceptions of economic insecurity also increased. Anti-immigrant sentiments decreased in 
countries where perceptions of economic insecurity declined. Their data revealed that 
country-level anti-immigrant attitudes and mean levels of perceived income insecurity are highly 
and significantly 17 correlated in both 2006 (r = .745) and 2010 (r = .840), indicating that 
countries with higher perceived income insecurity tend to show higher levels of anti-immigrant 
attitudes both before and after the crisis. The results of the analysis suggest that, on average, 
country average anti-immigrant sentiments tend to be less pronounced in prosperous countries 
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and more pronounced in countries where economic conditions are suppressed. The data analysis 
provided firm support for the expectation that individuals who feel less secure with their income 
are more likely to have negative attitudes toward immigrants. 
Impact of Skill and Unskilled labor on Anti-immigration Sentiments 
Looking further into this relationship, Mayda (2001) along with O’Rourke and Sinnott 
(2004) looked at the impact of skill distributions of native and foreign workers on 
anti-immigration sentiments. They found that low skilled or less educated individuals in 
developed countries have stronger anti-immigration sentiments. This is due to the fact that most 
immigrants to these countries are low skilled as well. Their presence increases the competition 
within this sector of the labor market which in turn decreases the wage of low skilled natives and 
increases their risk of unemployment. O’Rourke and Sinnott made a prediction in their paper that 
the impact of skills on anti-immigrant sentiment should be related to a country’s GDP per capita 
(O’rourke and Sinnott 2010) In the richest countries, being high-skilled should have a negative 
impact on anti-immigrant sentiment. In the poorest countries, being high-skilled should have a 
positive impact on anti-immigrant sentiment. In rich countries skilled workers favor both trade 
and immigration, while unskilled workers are protectionist and anti-immigration. In poor 
countries, it is the unskilled who are liberal in their attitudes towards both trade and immigration, 
while the skilled favor both protection and immigration restrictions. 
Cerna and Haynes (2010) look at the changes in high skilled immigration policies that 
have occured in the past decades within Europe. As a result of globalisation, there has been an 
increase in demand for high skilled labor and an increase in competition for finding the best and 
brightest. Having said that, in times in times of economic downturn and shock such as the global 
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economic crisis of 2008-2009, it usually “tightens its labour policies and begin to propose or 
implement more restrictive high skilled immigration (HSI) policies” (Cerna and Haynes 2010, pg 
15). These policy changes included reducing numerical limits/ quotas, as well as shortage lists, 
reinforcing labour market tests, making it difficult to renew work permits, limiting 
non-discretionary flows (e.g. family reunification, work permits for spouses) and encouraging 
return-migration (Cerna and Haynes 2010, pg 11). Labour market competition intensifies when 
unemployment rates increase and economic growth decreases because native and immigration 
labour forces are placed “in more direct competition than in periods of economic prosperity” 
(Cerna and Haynes 2010, pg 10). Many politicians and people justify restrictive immigration 
policies by looking at the unemployment rate yet according to Cerna and Haynes that is a lack of 
understanding regarding the mismatch of labour demand and supply. Thus although the highly 
skilled immigrant workers are taking jobs that there is a shortage of, they are still perceived as 
competition by non immigrants. The perception of labour migrants can be negative even if native 
workers are employed. 
Immigration and Competition of Public Goods  
Another economic factor that causes an increase in anti-immigration sentiments is the 
fear that immigrants burden public finances through intensive use of public services (Dustmann 
and Preston 2004, pg 11). One one hand, some natives fear that they will lose their job to 
immigrants. On the other hand, many natives fear having to carry the costs of more immigrants 
using social services. This leaves immigrants in a lose-lose situation in the public eye as they are 
either taking away jobs or free riding on benefits provided by the state. The anti-immigrant 
sentiment is motivated by fears that immigration will increases the natives’ tax burden 
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(Meseguer and Kemmerling 2018). Especially among high income natives, there is a fear that 
government will respond to increasing inflows of immigrants by raising taxes and leave social 
benefits untouched. If this is the formula policy makers choose, high-income natives should 
exhibit “the strongest opposition to immigrants having access to social services, particularly if 
immigrants are predominantly low-skilled” (Meseguer and Kemmerling 2018). Meseguer and 
Kemmerling found that dude to the fear of having to pay higher taxes as a result of high 
immigration rates, rich natives would be less likely to support immigration in states with high 
fiscal exposure. If policy makers choose to not increase taxes in response to increase in 
immigration flows, anti-immigration sentiments would still rise as now natives would be 
competing with immigrants for the same amount of social benefits.  
Similar to the work done by Kuntz, Davidov and Semyonov (2017), Meseguer and 
Kemmerling find that the natives perception of the impact of immigrants on public goods 
depends on their income. Since high-skilled immigrants do not crow out poor natives in the use 
of social services, rich natives will be in favor of skilled immigrants more than poor natives will 
be (Meseguer and Kemmerling 2010). If the natives fear being crowded out of the social 
services, then poor natives will be against unskilled immigrants more intensely than rich natives. 
Thus in states that are highly fiscally exposed, poor natives are significantly less likely to support 
unskilled immigration than in states with low exposure (Meseguer and Kemmerling 2010).  
To conclude, it is evident that economic concerns play a pivotal role in driving negative 
attitudes towards immigration. Globalisation has caused people to feel afraid and vulnerable 
about their job security. These feelings can quickly turn into xenophobia and racism towards 
newcomers as there is a belief that immigrants are the ones that are taking their jobs. In times of 
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economic downturn, these xenophobic and racist thoughts are exemplified. This is due to the fact 
that during these periods resources are more scarce and immigrants are perceived as competition 
and a threat. Furthermore Kuntz et al (2017) showed that in countries where perceptions of 
economic insecurity are high, anti-immigration sentiments are increased. This reinforces the 
notion that when economic conditions deteriorate, negative attitudes towards immigrants rise. 
 
                                                             CHAPTER V 
                                ​MORAL CONSEQUENCES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 
Within the ​Moral Consequences of Economic Growth​, Benjamin Friedman discusses the 
idea that despite the benefits of economic growth (such as rise in standard of living, less poverty 
and hunger, less disease), many people are uncomfortable with economic growth. With greater 
affluence comes better food, bigger house, more travel and improved medical care, many of 
these advantages lie mostly in the material realm. For Friedman, economic growth rarely means 
simply more. “The qualitative changes that accompany economic growth such as changes in 
work arrangement, in power structures have always generated resistance” (Friedman 2006, pg 
20). Nevertheless, “economic growth often leads to a rise in standard of living for the majority of 
citizens which results in greater opportunity, tolerance of diversity, social mobility and 
commitment to fairness” (Friedman 2006, pg 21).  
Although everybody wants to make more income as to enjoy a higher standard of living, 
better health and a greater sense of security, people’s happiness isn’t always associated with a 
higher income. What constitutes as “more” for people is relative and is based on them comparing 
their lives to some kind of reference point. When doing this comparison, individuals look at two 
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benchmarks:their own (or their family’s) past experience and how they see people living around 
them. When people are getting ahead, they are more inclined to be generous or tolerant to 
newcomers. Happiness of course isn't solely dependent on income however people with higher 
income typically have better educations and a stronger sense of security in the face of major life 
uncertainties. Economic growth allows people to feel better off as they are doing better 
compared to their previous benchmark. If people feel that they are living better than their past, 
their desire to liver better than other is greatly reduced. Once the growth stops however, no 
matter how people’s income have risen, it is only a matter of time before habits adapt and the 
sense of heightened well being disappears. When the economy stagnates, the importance people 
attach to living better than others who they compare themselves to becomes more intense. It is 
often people in the lower half of the income distribution, not the very poor but semiskilled 
workers, who react most defensively when an economy stagnates.  
For Friedman, economic growth or stagnation affect a society’s character. “This dynamic 
relationship reflects the process by which public attitudes form, before they result in new 
legislation or other changes in government” (Friedman 2006, pg 92). Once individuals have 
formed their basic attitudes about such matters, they are normally very slow to change them. The 
implication for that is people take on “certain basic attitudes in young adulthood, depending in 
large part on the economic conditions they experience in these formative years, and they retain 
those attitudes throughout the remainder of their lives” (Friedman 2006, pg 98). What matters is 
not whether people’s income and living standards have increased compared to the year before or 
even the year before that, but whether the average citizen can see progress over the last decade or 
the last generation . For individuals it is important to have a sense of getting ahead compared to 
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how their parents lived, and whether their experience gives them confidence that their children 
will do even better. For example the decade and a half following the Civil War brough exuberant 
economic growth that meant rapidly rising incomes for most Americans. “This led to a period of 
awareness of progress and an appreciation of individual opportunity leading to Congress 
sponsoring the Civil Rights Act of 1875 which forbid discrimination based on race in a variety of 
public and private activities” (Friedman 2006, pg 130).  
Friedman’s theories directly apply to attitudes towards immigration as one could argue 
that individuals who feel that they have not gotten ahead compared to their parents, would 
display more negative attitudes towards immigration as they would see immigrants as a possible 
reason for their inability to attain upward mobility. In this way, Friedman’s theory regarding 
economic growth builds off of many of the economic determinants that were discussed in earlier 
sections. For example, previous papers argued that during times of economic downturn or 
stagnation, negative attitudes towards immigrants increase. This theory goes in hand with 
Friedman’s argument as  he argued that during these periods, people don’t feel like they are 
getting ahead which can cause them to feel insecure. If individuals feel like they are not doing 
better, they are going to be far less tolerant of newcomers. In these periods of economic 
downturn, resources are scarce and immigrants are seen as a threat and competition whereas in 
times of economic prosperity, people are more likely to be welcoming and generous towards 
newcomers.  
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                                                                CHAPTER VI  
                                                                  ​THE DATA  
The data for this paper will come from the General Social Survey. It is cross sectional 
cumulative data from 1972 to 2016. My dependent variable for measuring people’s view on 
immigration will be ​Letin1 ​from the General Social Survey however it will be renamed as 
Anti-immigration ​for my regressions in order to be able to analyze the coefficient more 
effectively. The higher the coefficient, the more individuals are displaying anti-immigration 
sentiments The variable asks people “Do you think the number of immigrants to America 
nowadays should be…?” to which respondents punch in answer of 1 to 4 with 1 being increased 
a lot and 4 being reduced a lot.  I renamed this variable to ​anti-immigration ​as the variable is 
intended to measure the people’s preference over immigration flows thus a higher number 
coefficient for that variables indicates higher anti-immigration sentiments. 
The constant independent variable that I used for an individual was region, gender and 
race. 
Region​: ​This variable ask respondent what region he/she is from. The answers range from 1 to 9. 
1 is New England, 2 - Middle Atlantic, 3 - East Coast Central, 4 - West North Central, 5 - South 
Atlantic, 6 - East South Central, 7 - West South Central, 8 - Mountain, 9 - Pacific.  
Age​: ​This variable measures the responder’s age. Answers range from 1 representing 10-19 years 
to 8 which is 80 years and above.  
Gender​: ​Responders answer 1 if they identify as a male and 2 if they identify as a female. 
Race: ​Responders were asked what race they consider themselves. The responses were 1 to 3 
with 1 being white, 2 being black and 3 being other. 
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The independent variables that I looked at to measure current economic status are marital 
status, education levels, occupational prestige level and income. 
Marital​: ​The respondent is asked about his/her current marital status. Answers range from 1 to 4 
with 1 being legally married, 2 being in a civil union or registered domestic partnership, 3 being 
separated and 4 being not currently married or in a civil union or registered domestic partnership 
Educ​: ​The responder is asked about his/her education level. Answers range from 0 which is no 
formal schooling to 20 which is 8 years of formal schooling 
Realinc​: The respondent is asked how much income they have earned 
Incom16​: Thinking about the time when you were 16 years old, compared with American 
families in general then, would you say your family income was? Answers range from 1-5: far 
below average (1), below average (2), average (3), above average (4), or far above average (5)? 
Paeduc​: ​Respondents are asked on the level of education that their father received. Answers 
range from 0 which is no formal schooling to 20 which is 8 years of formal schooling.  
Maeduc​: ​Same as above except respondents are asked about their mother’s level of education 
Prestg10: ​Respondents are asked about their occupation prestige score. Answers range from 0 to 
100 with 0 being the lowers prestige score and 100 being the highest.  
Papres10​: Respondents are asked about the occupation prestige score of their father. Answers 
are calculated in the range from 0-100 similar to ​Prestg10 
Mapres10: ​Respondents are asked about the occupation prestige score of their mother. Answers 
range from 0 to 100 again.  
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CHAPTER VII 
                                                     ​THE EMPIRICAL MODEL 
To view factors that might have an impact on people’s response to the immigration 
question (variable ​anti-immigration​), the variable will be regressed against other social and 
cultural variables. The equation for the regression will be: 
nti mmigration α βXit δR γ κZit tA − I =  +  +  +  +  + ε  
The coefficient will be the constant factors such as age, age squared, gender. If the coefficientα   
for age is large and positive we expect that the older individuals are, the more they are opposed 
to immigrants entering the country.  is the social variables such as income, level of education X  
and marital status. Based off of other papers, we would expect that individuals with low income 
and low level of education will be more opposed to immigration thus we would assume that the 
coefficients for income and level of education to be negative. Coefficient  will be the regionalR  
variable. This will look at how people from different regions of United States will respond to 
immigration. Coefficient​  represents the cultural variables which will be religion. I will look atγ  
two variables, (relig) which looks at the religion that individuals associate themselves with and 
(attend) which looks at how often individuals attend religious events.  
The coefficient will be the generational variables I will look at. I want to use theseZ  
variables to look at the impact of generational changes on individual’s attitudes towards 
immigration. The first generational change to look at is the generational change in income. 
Friedman’s getting ahead theory is based on economic growth and he associates growth with an 
increase in income. The variable for generational change in income is ​incz​ and  is calculated by 
subtracting ​Realinc​, the current income level of the respondent subtracted by ​incom16​ which is 
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how much the respondents parents were earning when he/she was 16. We would predict that if 
people are making more money now than what their parents were making, then that individual 
will be more tolerant towards immigrants as that individual feels like they have achieved upward 
mobility.  
Geneducm ​is the generational change in education for a man. It is calculated by 
subtracting the education level of the individual’s father by the individual’s current level of 
education. ​Geneducf​ is the generational change in education for a female and it is calculated by 
subtracting the education level of the individual’s mother by the current individual’s current 
level of education. ​Gened_pa​ measures the generational change in education between the 
individual and both of his parents If an individual has received a higher education than their 
parents, their result will be positive for this algorithm and therefore we would expect them to be 
more open to immigration policies as they’re in a better position than their parents were. 
Similarly if an individual’s result is negative, that means they have received a lower education 
than their parents thus it is more likely that they would develop more anti-immigration 
sentiments.  
General change in prestige is an important variable to look at since changes in 
occupational prestige can indicate upward mobility as well. An individual could be earning less 
than their parents however if they are working at job with a higher occupational prestige ranking 
they will still feel like they have achieved upward mobility. Sociologists have identified prestige 
rankings for more than 700 occupations based on results from a series of national surveys. They 
created a scale with 0 being the lowest possible score to 100 being the highest, and then ranked 
the occupations based on the results of the survey Generational change in prestige for man is 
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identified as ​prestigem ​and is calculated by subtracting the man’s current occupation’s level of 
prestige ​prestg10​ minus the prestige of his dad’s occupation ​papres10. ​Generational change in 
occupation prestige for a women is identified as ​prestigef. ​It is calculated by subtracting the 
women’s current occupation’s level of prestige ​prestg10​ minus the prestige of her mom’s 
occupation ​mapres10​.  
         CHAPTER VIII 
        ​DATA ANALYSIS 
In this section, I run regressions to see how different variables impact the response of 
individuals towards the dependent variable, ​anti-immigration​. The first regression is a baseline 
regression that looks at the current socio-economic status and demographic variables that 
impacts people’s anti-immigration sentiments. The baseline regression shows if the data supports 
the theories that we explored in the literature review. Theories such as, are unemployed or 
uneducated individuals more likely to be more hostile to immigrants. After the baseline 
regression, I run regressions with the generational variables in order to see if Friedman’s “getting 
ahead” theory is supported in the data. Friedman uses change in income as an indicator for 
economic progress thus I will run regressions using the generational change in income. To test 
other generational variables that can indicate upward mobility, I run regressions with the 
generational change in education along with the generational change in occupational prestige. By 
looking at three different variations of generational variables, we can get a more in depth look of 
how generational changes can impact an individual's views towards immigration.  
Table 1 displays the baseline regression for an individual’s response to the letin variable 
from the GSS survey. The Letin variable has been renamed ​anti-immigration​ within these 
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regressions in order to be able to read the coefficient with more ease. A higher coefficient for 
anti-immigration​ means that individuals want less immigrants entering the country. For the first 
regression, we are looking at current socio economic components along with demographic 
factors of an individual and how different variables impact the individual’s response to the letin 
question. To account for different levels of anti-immigration sentiments than can rise in specific 
years and in specific regions, I ran the regression with interaction variables between year and 
region. For example in the New York region, anti-immigration sentiments might be higher in 
2001 as a result of 9/11 than any other parts of the United States thus the interaction variable can 
account for that.  
The results for the baseline regression results differ from the theories presented by Mayda 
(2001), O’Rourke and Sinnott (2004) along with Kuntz, Davidov and Semyonov (2017) within 
the literature review. They had found that low skilled and unemployed individuals in developed 
countries have stronger anti-immigration sentiments as they believe that immigrants will take 
their jobs. Within my regression however, those who were unemployed displayed a statistically 
significant  negative coefficient for ​anti-immigration​ indicating that they are more open to 
immigrants entering the country. Those who are housekeepers displayed a negative coefficient 
indicating that they are more open to immigrants. This could possibly be due to the fact that they 
feel their job is quite safe and will most likely not be replaced by immigrants. The results for 
education however do fit previous theory. (Kuntz et al. 2017) present the theory that individuals 
who have a lower level of education feel particularly vulnerable and as a result feel threatened by 
the presence of newcomers The coefficient ​education​ in my regression was negative and 
statistically significant which indicates that an extra year of education causes individuals to be 
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more tolerant towards immigrants. Those who receive a higher level of education are less likely 
to feel threatened by newcomers as the jobs that they are going after are not always the jobs 
provided to new immigrants within the country. The variable for income is ​realinc​. The 
coefficient for ​realinc ​is negative which fits the theory presented by Kuntz, Davidov and 
Semyonov (2017). At the individual level, Kuntz, Davidov and Semyonov had expected that the 
lower the perceived income of the individual, the stronger the negative attitude towards 
immigrant thus a higher perceived income should correlate with a more positive attitude towards 
immigrants. The negative coefficient for ​realinc ​means that those with higher income, feel less 
vulnerable and are more likely to be open towards immigrants.  
Another important coefficients to look at is ​race.​ For both variables of race, the 
coefficients were statistically significant with individuals who identified as blacks and other 
races reporting a negative coefficient. This means that both group of people are more tolerant 
towards immigrants. This could be due to the fact that both groups of people feel like they are 
facing anti-immigration sentiments as a result of group threat theory. That sense of struggling 
from the same obstacles and a feeling of unity could possibly be the reason that blacks and other 
races display lower anti-immigration sentiments. Another important coefficient to note is that 
individuals who are not married also displayed a negative coefficient indicating a less hostile 
outlook towards immigrants. The coefficient of age was statistically significant with a positive 
coefficient indicating that the higher the age of individuals, the more hostile they are towards 
immigrants. This could be due to the fact that the older generation might be more conservative 
and more inclined to stick to their traditional beliefs.  
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Table 3 displays the generational change in income for an individual through the variable 
incz​. The coefficient for the generational change in income is statistically insignificant which 
differs from the theory presented by Friedman. According to Friedman, individuals whose are 
currently making more than what their parents were making when they were 16 should feel like 
they are getting ahead which results in a greater tolerance of diversity. Yet the data in table 3 
displays that generational change in income does not have a large impact on people’s 
anti-immigration sentiment. Part of this reason could be issues with the data for ​income16​. Many 
individuals at 16 might not know how much their parents are making as financial matters are a 
private matter in many households.  
Table 4 presents the impact of the generational change in education on the 
anti-immigration ​variable. The three key variables to be looking at are ​geneducm, geneducf​ and 
gened_pa​. The coefficient for geneducf is statistically significant and negative indicating that 
females who receive a higher education than their mother, are more open to immigrants. As well, 
the coefficient for education is -0.0385 which means that an extra year of education causes 
females to be 0.0385 less hostile towards immigrants. As indicated by the negative ​gened_pa 
coefficient, individuals who receive a higher education level than both of their parents are less 
hostile to immigrants as well. These results fit the “getting ahead” theory presented by Benjamin 
Friedman in the literature review section. When individuals are receiving a higher education than 
their parents, especially females who are receiving a higher education than their mothers, they 
have a sense of getting ahead compared to how their parents lived, and this gives them 
confidence that their children will do even better. This confidence means that these individuals 
feel less vulnerable to outsiders and are more likely to be open to immigrants. The results for 
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generational change in education is likely higher for females as they have achieved much higher 
upward mobility in the past decades when compared to men. Women had high labor market 
participation during World War II and the feminist movement of 1960s allowed women to enter 
the workforce in great numbers. In this way, most women have experienced a much higher level 
of education than their mother as they have had more opportunities available to them. Men have 
traditionally always been in the workforce and have been able to achieve higher level of 
education thus men are more likely to feel like they are not getting ahead.  
Table 5 displays the generational change in prestige of an individual's occupation. Within 
the GSS, each occupation has a level of prestige associated with it, the numbers ranging from 0 
being the lowest to 100 being the highest level of prestige. With the generational change in 
income being statistically insignificant, I thought that the generational difference in prestige 
could display a bigger impact on an individual's feeling of getting ahead. For example an 
individual can be doing a job that is earning him/her less money than her parents but the job’s 
prestige level is deemed higher so that individual might still feel that he/she is achieving upward 
mobility. While the coefficient for ​prestigem ​is statistically significant and is positive, it doesn’t 
appear to have a huge impact on an individual’s anti-immigration sentiments. Having said that, 
since the coefficient is not negative, it means that men who are currently working a job more 
prestigious than their dads, are against immigrants entering the country.  
Friedman’s theory that individuals who feel that they are doing better than their parents 
are more likely to be more tolerant towards immigrants, was only supported in the generational 
change in education with the largest impact coming from generational change in education for 
females. Females who are attaining a higher education than their mothers, did show to be more 
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tolerant towards immigrants by displaying a statistically significant negative coefficient. The 
generational change in education for both parents was also negative further supporting 
Friedman's theory. Friedman’s “getting ahead” theory was initially about generational change in 
income however our data reported statistically insignificant coefficient for changes in income 
meaning that the change in income had minimal impact on an individual’s anti-immigration 
sentiments. This could however be due to the fact that many individuals at the age of 16 do not 
have knowledge of how much their parents are earning. Many households keep financial matters 
private in contrast to education level or even occupational prestige. It is far more likely that an 
individual at 16 knows if his/her parents went to college or where they are employed as opposed 
to how much income they are earning. The generational change in prestige of occupation for 
males was statistically significant and positive which indicates that men who are currently 
employed at job that has a higher prestige than their father’s job, are less tolerant towards 
immigrants. This goes against Friedman’s theory as those who are doing better than their parents, 
in this case employed a job with a higher prestige than what their father did for a living, should 
theoretically be more tolerant towards immigrants.  
                                                         ​   CHAPTER IX 
CONCLUSION 
Friedman’s getting ahead theory provided an interesting perspective to look at when 
determining what factors can cause anti-immigration sentiments to rise. His theory is based on 
looking at an individual’s past and where they come from as opposed to strictly looking at 
current socioeconomic status. While the generational change in education fit Friedman’s theory, 
the results from the other generational variables told a different picture. Generational change in 
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income ended up being insignificant and generational change in occupational prestige revealed a 
theory opposite to Friedman in the sense that males who are employed in a job with a higher 
prestige than their father’s displayed more anti-immigration sentiments. These results indicate 
that generational factors are not as important in impacting people’s anti-immigration sentiments 
especially for males. The data for men showed that even those who achieved upward mobility 
compared to their parents, maintained the same level of anti-immigration sentiments. This means 
that many individuals develop their view towards immigration at a young age and likely hold 
onto the same beliefs when they get older regardless of how much upward mobility they achieve. 
That would indicate current socio-economic status and demographic factors could still be a better 
indicator of an individual's anti-immigration sentiments.  
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                                                            APPENDIX 
Table 1. Size and Share of the Foreign-Born Population in the United States, 1970-2016 
 
 
Table 2. Individual's response to GSS Survey 
 
  (2) 
VARIABLES anti 
   immigration 
    
Part time -0.103*** 
  (0.0299) 
Temp not working 0.0535 
  (0.0619) 
Unemployed/laid off -0.0117 
  (0.0476) 
Retired -0.0659* 
  (0.0337) 
School -0.119** 
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  (0.0526) 
Keeping House -0.0526 
  (0.0324) 
Other 0.0846 
  (0.0592) 
Married -0.00589 
  (0.0385) 
Widowed 0.0207 
  (0.0266) 
Divorced -0.0956* 
  (0.0498) 
Never Married -0.124*** 
  (0.0266) 
childs 0.00738 
  (0.00646) 
age 0.00276*** 
  (0.000798) 
educ -0.0448*** 
  (0.00339) 
sex 0.0357* 
  (0.0188) 
black -0.218*** 
  (0.0273) 
other -0.594*** 
  (0.0337) 
realinc -4.61e-07 
  (3.11e-07) 
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Constant 4.343*** 
  (0.153) 
    
Observations 13,881 
R-squared 0.084 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 2 Notes: Baseline Regression with interaction variables between Year and region 
 
 
Table 3. Generational Change in Income 
 
Table 3 Notes: Generational change in income. Controlling for year, region, marital status, 
number of children, work status and race 
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Table 4. Generational Change in Education 
 
Table 4 notes: Generational Education variable. Controlling for year, region, marital status, 
number of children, work status and race. 
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Table 5. Generational Change in Prestige 
 
Table 5 notes: Generational Occupation Prestige. Controlling for year, region, marital status, 
number of children, work status and race.  
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Table 6. Summary Statistic of Variables. 
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